On April 17, 2024, the Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, holding that an employee alleging a discriminatory job transfer must show that the transfer inflicted “some harm with respect to an identifiable term or condition of employment,” but, that such harm “need not be significant” to violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, 601 U.S. —-, at *2 (2024).
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” § 2000e-2(a)(1). The Supreme Court previously interpreted this statute to require that employees must demonstrate some “disadvantageous” change in their employment terms and conditions to violate Title VII. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). Following Oncale, courts were split as to what was required for an employee to challenge a transfer under Title VII as an “adverse employment action.” Some circuits found no showing of harm was necessary beyond establishing the discriminatory act itself, and other circuits generally applied a heightened standard of harm for claims to be actionable under Title VII.
In Muldrow, a female police sergeant brought suit against her employer, the St. Louis Police Department, alleging sex discrimination because she was forced to transfer from her position in the Intelligence Division to a patrol position. Her supervisor forced this transfer because he believed that a male police officer would be a “better fit” for the “very dangerous” role. The plaintiff’s rank and pay remained the same after the transfer, but her duties, schedule and position perks changed. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department; and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the plaintiff failed to show that the transfer caused her a “materially significant disadvantage” given the transfer “did not result in a diminution to her title, salary, or benefits” and had caused “only minor changes in working conditions.”
On appeal, the Supreme Court firmly rejected the “materially significant disadvantage” standard, holding that it creates a high bar found nowhere in the text of Title VII. Writing for the Court, Justice Kagan explained that “[a]lthough an employee must show some harm from a forced transfer to prevail in a Title VII suit, she need not show that the injury satisfies a significance test.” To demand “‘significance’ is to add words — and significant words, as it were — to the statute Congress enacted.” The Court also clarified that an employee does not have to establish “economic or tangible” changes in the terms or conditions of the plaintiff’s employment in order to meet the standard of “some harm.”
Thus, following Muldrow, employees need only show “some harm” to proceed with a discriminatory job transfer claim against their employers under Title VII. While this decision provides little practical guidance for courts, the ruling will likely make it easier for employees to bring workplace discrimination claims under the lower standard established by the Court. It is also possible employees may use the decision to challenge other employment decisions, such as changes in schedules or work assignments, training, mentorship, or any changes in the terms and conditions of employment. The full implications of Muldrow remain to be seen..
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